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(1994), Trejos (forthcoming)
and Ritter (1995).
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earch-based theories of the exchange
process provide economists with a
way of formalizing the microfounda-
tions of monetary economics and to dis-
cuss a variety of issues in monetary the-
ory and policy in a new light.1 Many
questions that cannot even be formulated
in more traditional monetary models can
be proﬁtably analyzed in these new mod-
els. In this essay, we propose to review re-
cent developments using search-based
models to study some international mone-
tary issues.
There seems little doubt that interna-
tional monetary economics is of central
importance today. Of the types of ques-
tions one would ultimately like to answer,
consider these:
• Should Europe adopt a common
currency? 
• If so, should individual countries
continue to issue local currencies? 
• If a state or province separates from
a nation (as Quebec periodically
discusses in Canada), how should it
design its monetary system? 
• Should more Latin American coun-
tries adopt currency boards, where
each unit of local currency is
backed by central bank reserves in
U.S. dollars (as in Argentina)? 
• Should more Latin American coun-
tries simply abandon their local cur-
rency and switch to U.S. dollars (as
Panama did)? 
Though we do not claim to be ready
to provide deﬁnitive answers to all of these
important questions at this time, we do
think that search-theoretic models are in
principle well suited to address these types
of issues. More traditional theory, includ-
ing models that include cash-in-advance
or money-in-the-utility-function type as-
sumptions, are clearly ill suited in this re-
gard. They are ill suited because too much
is decided by assumption. In particular,
the answer to the question, “Which
monies circulate in which countries?” is
determined at the outset by the modeler
when he chooses which money to put 
in which cash-in-advance constraint or in
which utility function. In contrast, 
search models are designed to determine
endogenously which monies circulate
where.
We begin by reviewing a version of 
the model in Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and 
Matsui (1993). Basically, it can be de-
scribed as follows. There are two countries,
each of which issues its own currency.
There is a meeting or matching technology
that describes the frequency with which a
given individual interacts with other indi-
viduals, both locals and foreigners (it is as-
sumed that one interacts with individuals
from one’s own country more often than 
a foreigner interacts with these same indi-
viduals). When two agents meet, one 
with money and the other with real output
for sale, they have to decide whether to
trade. Parameter values, as well as expecta-
tions regarding other agents’ behavior,
jointly determine this decision and thereby
determine the realm of circulation for each
currency. Potentially there are three dis-
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tinct types of equilibria—or regimes—in
which we are interested, where none, one,
or both of the currencies circulate interna-
tionally.
This model allows one to answer ques-
tions like the following:
• What features of a country make it
possible, or likely, for its currency to
circulate internationally? 
• How and when can local currencies
survive in the presence of a univer-
sally accepted international cur-
rency? 
• Does an international currency
emerge naturally as economies be-
come integrated? 
• What are the costs and beneﬁts to a
country of having its currency serve
as an international medium of ex-
change? 
• An extension of this model in Zhou
(1994) additionally allows one to
study the issue of when agents
would want to exchange currencies
in such a world. 
There are shortcomings with the mod-
els mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Perhaps the most obvious is that in these
models, as in all of the ﬁrst-generation
search-based models of money, every ex-
change is assumed to be a one-for-one
trade. This simplifying assumption makes
it possible to discuss the process of ex-
change—and, in particular, which objects
circulate as media of exchange among
which agents—without tackling the deter-
mination of the relative values of these ob-
jects. Unfortunately, however, it obviously
also makes it impossible to talk about
prices or exchange rates. Therefore, we
also present the extension of the model in
Trejos and Wright (1995b) designed to en-
dogenize prices using bargaining theory.2
This extension allows us to raise a
whole range of new issues, including the
following: 
• How does the fact that a currency
circulates internationally affect its
purchasing power at home?
• Where does an international cur-
rency purchase more—at home or
abroad? 
• What are the effects on seigniorage
and welfare in each country when
one money becomes an interna-
tional currency?
• How are policies designed to maxi-
mize either seigniorage or welfare
affected by concerns of currency
substitution?
• How are national monetary policies
connected, and what is the scope
for international cooperation?
In the next section, we outline the
basic assumptions on which the model is
built. The third section presents the indi-
visible output version of the model in
Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993).
We then present the divisible output
model with bargaining in Trejos and
Wright (1995b), followed by a discussion
of some policy implications. The ﬁnal sec-
tion presents some brief conclusions.
THE BASIC MODEL
The economy consists of two coun-
tries, labeled i = 1, 2. One’s country is im-
portant in that it determines the frequency
with which one interacts with other
agents. Individuals interact, or meet, bilat-
erally according to a random matching
process in continuous time, and ˆ ij de-
notes the Poisson arrival rate at which a
citizen of Country i meets citizens of
Country j. We assume that ˆ ii ³ ˆ ji for 
j ¹ i. This simply says that, for example, a
Mexican meets Mexicans more frequently
than an American meets Mexicans.
Each country starts with a large num-
ber of citizens, and the fraction of individ-
uals from Country i is Ni with N1 + N2 = 1.
Thereafter, both populations grow at the
2 Bargaining was ﬁrst introduced
into (one-country) search mod-
els of money in Trejos and
Wright (1995a) and Shi
(1995b). Other recent applica-
tions include Aiyagari et al.
(1996), Trejos (1994), and
Shi (1995a).MAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6
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same rate  ³ 0. The population sizes and
the meeting technology parameters are not
independent because we have the identity
N1 ˆ 12 = N2 ˆ 21 (both sides of the equality
give the total number of international
meetings per unit time). Here we take ˆ ij
as primitive and let the populations be free
to satisfy this identity. A special case is the
speciﬁcation actually used in Matsuyama,
Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993), which has
ˆ ii = N1 and ˆ ij = *Nj, with * < . Thus,
arrival rates are proportional to country
size, but they are smaller across countries
than they are within countries. As  * gets
closer to  , the two countries become
more integrated.3
Agents are distinguished not only by
their country and date of birth, but also by
their tastes and technologies. As in the
typical monetary search model, we need to
adopt some notion of specialization. Here,
for simplicity, it is assumed that there are
K ³ 3 goods and the population of each
country contains equal numbers of K
types, where each Type k consumes only
Good k and produces only Good k +1
(modulo K; that is, Type K produces Good
1). If we assume that meetings are random
with respect to consumption-production
type, then  ij = ˆ ij / K is the rate at which
a citizen of Country i meets a citizen of
Country j who consumes the good he pro-
duces; it is also the rate at which the
citizen of Country i meets a citizen of
Country j who produces the good he
consumes.
There is no centralized market or auc-
tioneer in this model: All trade is bilateral
and quid pro quo. The large number of
agents rules out private credit because the
probability of meeting a particular individ-
ual a second time is zero. Our speciﬁca-
tion for tastes and technologies rules out
direct barter. We also make the assump-
tion that goods are nonstorable, which
rules out commodity money. Hence, trade
requires the use of some form of ﬁat
money as a medium of exchange. 
However—and this is the crucial point—
we do not impose that any particular cur-
rency plays this role in any particular
transaction. This is what distinguishes the
class of models under consideration from
ones with particular cash-in-advance or
money-in-the-utility-function assumptions
imposed exogenously.4
Fiat money is introduced by the gov-
ernment of Country j issuing one unit of
Currency j to some fraction Mj Î (0,1) of
its newborn citizens, at each point in time,
in exchange for some amount of real out-
put (how much real output depends on
what assumptions we make). Issuing
money in this way yields a continuous ﬂow
of seigniorage, although notice that the
only time private agents interact with the
government is when they ﬁrst enter the
economy. In the special case where = 0,
the government simply issues an input of
currency to some fraction of its citizens
at the initial date and then shuts down.
To keep things tractable, we make the
following assumptions. First, we assume
that an agent holding a unit of currency
always spends it all at once, which could
obviously be guaranteed if we simply say
that the monetary object is indivisible.
This implies that no one holding currency
ever holds less than one unit. Second, we
assume that, except for the newborn, no
agent can produce until after he consumes.
This implies that two agents with currency
do not trade with each other, and no one
ever holds more than one unit of money.
Hence at each point in time there will be
some agents with one unit of money each,
called buyers, and a disjoint group with 
no money, called sellers. Let the fraction 
of buyers from Country i with Currency j
be denoted mij, and the fraction of sellers
from Country i be denoted mi0 = 1 - mi1 -
mi2. Then the vector m = (mij) completely
describes the asset distribution across
agents.
What happens when a buyer and seller
meet depends on which version of the
model we consider. In Matsuyama,
Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993), output is in-
divisible and the same across the two
countries. Thus if you ﬁnd a seller who
can produce the right type of output, there
is no question that you always want to
trade your money for his one indivisible
good, and, in particular, you do not care
3 In this model one does not
physically travel between one
country and another, nor does
one choose in any other way to
interact with foreigners instead
of fellow citizens. It is simply
that you sometimes meet for-
eigners in your daily routine.
Imagine, for example, a town
on the border populated by
both Mexicans and Americans.
Americans trade with fellow
Americans and with Mexicans,
although perhaps less frequent-
ly with the latter and vice
versa. What we are interested
in here is the monetary nature
of these interactions; that is,
which currencies get traded by
whom?
4 The simplifying assumptions in
the text allow us to focus exclu-
sively on the use of ﬁat curren-
cies as media of exchange, but
in principle they can all be
relaxed. For examples of mone-
tary search models with credit,
see Hendry (1992) or Shi
(1995a); for examples with
some direct barter, see Kiyotaki
and Wright (1991 and 1993)
or Burdett et al. (1995); and
for examples with commodity
money, see Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989), Aiyagari and Wallace
(1991), or Li (1995).about the seller’s nationality. In Zhou
(1994), output is indivisible but differs
across the two countries, and consumers
have tastes that ﬂuctuate randomly, which
means they generally do care about the
seller’s nationality. In Trejos and Wright
(1995b), a unit of output is the same
across countries, but output is perfectly di-
visible and the amount of output that you
get for your money needs to be negotiated.
This means that you might care about the
nationality of the seller if the (endoge-
nous) prices differ across countries.
In any case, the important thing from
our vantage is whether a buyer from
Country h with Currency i trades with a
citizen of Country j because this deter-
mines the steady-state distribution of as-
sets across the population. In this article,
we consider only equilibria where trade al-
ways occurs if a buyer with Currency i
meets a seller from Country i (pesos deﬁ-
nitely circulate in Mexico and dollars
deﬁnitely circulate in the United States).
Then the key issue is whether trade occurs
when a seller meets a buyer with foreign
currency—that is, whether exchange oc-
curs when a buyer with Currency i meets
a seller from Country j ¹ i.
We distinguish the different types of
possible equilibria—or different regimes—
as follows. Let  j = 1 if within Country j we
see Currency i ¹ j in circulation, in which
case we call Currency i an international cur -
rency; and let  j = 0 if in Country j we do
not see Currency i in circulation. Then a
regime is a list of values for  = ( 1, 2).
The four possible regimes are = (0,0),
(1,1), (0,1), and (1,0). In the ﬁrst case
there is no international currency; in the
second case both currencies are interna-
tional; and in the ﬁnal two cases only one
currency is international. Because the last
two are mirror images, we focus for now
only on the latter, = (1,0). Hence there
are three cases to consider, with either 0, 1,
or 2 international monies.5
Given a regime, one can determine the
steady-state values of mij, independent of
whether output is divisible, as follows.
First, note that  i = 0 implies mij = 0 (if
Americans never trade for pesos then they
never hold pesos). Second, note that
trades between a buyer and seller of the
same nationality do not alter m because
they leave the aggregate distribution un-
changed. These considerations imply that
the steady-state equations are
(1) i jmi0mj i - i jmi imj0 j + (Mi - mi i) = 0 ,
(2) ijmi0mjj i - ijmijmj0 - mij = 0,
for i ¹ j. Given  and the identity
mi0 = 1 - mii - mij, these can be solved for
the steady-state asset distribution m.
Consider equation 1 (equation 2 has a
similar interpretation). The ﬁrst term says
that mii increases when a seller from Coun-
try i meets a buyer from Country j with
Currency i (given the maintained assump-
tion that when a seller from Country i
meets a buyer with Currency i, they always
trade). The second term says that mii de-
creases when a buyer from Country i with
Currency i meets a seller from Country j if
they trade (that is, if  j = 1). The ﬁnal term
says that mii increases when the fraction of
the newborn agents in Country i who re-
ceive currency, Mi, exceeds mii. Steady state
requires the net change to be zero.
Given the asset distribution, the idea is
to use dynamic programming to solve the
individual decision problems concerning
when to trade. The next section considers
the model with indivisible output, where
every trade is a one-for-one swap. The sec-
tion after that considers the case where out-
put is divisible and agents bargain.
THE MODEL WITH 
INDIVISIBLE OUTPUT
Here we analyze the model with indi-
visible output. This is a useful ﬁrst step, in
that it allows us to determine the circum-
stances under which the different curren-
cies will be used in transactions between
different agents without simultaneously
solving the bargaining problems facing
these agents. For simplicity, we are inter-
ested here only in steady-state equilibria,
where the asset distribution and trading
strategies are constant with respect to
5 In the model in Matsuyama,
Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993),
these are the only possible
regimes, except for possibly
equilibria where at most one of
the monies has value or equilib-
ria that are the same except for
relabeling in the sense that we
call American money pesosand
Mexican money dollars. In the
model in Trejos and Wright
(1995b), there are other candi-
date regimes, where whether
Seller jtakes Currency i
depends on who the buyer is
(say, Mexican sellers take dol-
lars from Americans but not
from other Mexicans); but
these candidate regimes can
never be equilibria under rela-
tively weak restrictions.
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strategy equilibria.
Let the utility from consuming a unit of
one’s consumption good be Uand the disu-
tility of producing one’s production good be
C, where 0 £C<U. Let Vij denote the ex-
pected lifetime utility for a buyer from
Countryiwith Currency j, and Vi0expected
lifetime utility for a seller from Countryi
with no money. Let V=(Vij). We call these
the value functions. They satisfy the fol-
lowing ﬂow versions of the Bellman equa-
tions from dynamic programming, 
(3) rVi0 = ( iimii + ijmji)(Vii - Vi0 - C)
+ ( iimij + ijmjj) i(Vij - Vi0 - C)
(4) rVii = ( iimi0 + ijmj0 j)(U + Vi0 - Vii)
(5) r Vi j = ( i imi0 i + i jmj0) (U + Vi0 - Vi j) ,
where r is the rate of time preference. The
value functions are indexed by the agent’s
nationality, i, but not by his (consump-
tion/production specialization) type, k, be-
cause we will only consider equilibria that
are symmetric in the sense that all types
use the same strategy and receive the same
payoff in equilibrium. 
The Bellman equations are interpreted
as follows. Equation 3 says that the ﬂow
value of being a seller from Countryiis the
rate at which one meets local or foreign buy-
ers with Currency imultiplied by the gain
from trade in such a meeting, plus the rate at
which one meets local or foreign buyers
with Currency jmultiplied by the gain from
trade if such a meeting results in trade (that
is, if  i=1). Equation 4 says that the ﬂow
value to holding domestic money is the rate
at which one meets local sellers (who al-
ways take local currency) or foreign sellers
who take local currency (which they do if 
i=1) multiplied by the gain from trading.
Equation 5 has a similar interpretation.6
Whether exchange occurs in a meet-
ing depends here exclusively on the seller
because the buyer wants to trade in every
meeting where the seller can produce his
desired consumption good—he gets an in-
divisible unit of output in every trade. Re-
call that here we look only for equilibria
where sellers always want to trade for local
currency, although it still has to be
checked that this is rational. The interest-
ing issue is whether a seller wants to trade
for foreign currency. Whether he wants to
trade for foreign money depends on the
following incentive condition:
(6) Vij - C > Vi0 Þ i = 1.
(7) Vij - C < Vi0 Þ i = 0.
That is, a seller accepts foreign money just
in case the value of holding foreign money
minus production costs exceeds the value
of remaining a seller (and waiting for local
money).
An equilibrium here can be deﬁned as
a list ( ,m,V) satisfying equations 1–7. For
each possible regime we will solve equa-
tions 1–5 and check equations 6–7; if
equations 6–7 are satisﬁed, this regime
constitutes an equilibrium. In this way we
can determine the parameter values that
allow the existence of each type of equilib-
rium. For simplicity, and to facilitate com-
parison with Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and
Matsui (1993), we consider here only the
limiting case where C ® 0. 
NO INTERNATIONAL
MONEY
Consider ﬁrst the regime with no in-
ternational money, and, therefore, no in-
ternational trade:  = (0,0). In this case
equations 1–2 imply mii = Mi and mij = 0
for j ¹ i. To see when this regime actually
constitutes an equilibrium, insert m and
= 0 into equations 3–5 to yield 
(8) rVi0 = iiMi(Vii - Vi0)
(9) rVii = ii(1 - Mi)(U + Vi0 - Vii)
(10) rVij = ij(1 - Mj)(U + Vi0 - Vij).
Note that in this regime, citizens of Coun-
try i never actually hold Currency j ¹ i,
but Vij gives the value they would achieve
if they were to accept Currency j.
6 One can prove that there are
no currency exchanges in pure-
strategy equilibrium; that is,
there is no trade when an
agent with Currency 1 meets
an agent with Currency 2.
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maintained hypothesis that agents always
accept local currency and the incentive
conditions in equations 6–7 that say, in
this case, that they do not accept foreign
currency. The former is satisﬁed for all
parameter values in this case. Hence it re-
mains only to check Vij £ Vi0. Simple alge-
bra implies that this holds if and only if 
(11) ij(1 - Mj) £ .
One thing we can conclude from this
analysis is that for this regime to constitute
an equilibrium we require ijto be small rel-
ative to  ii. If one meets foreigners fre-
quently enough, then it is not rational to re-
ject foreign money even if you expect local
sellers will reject it. Hence a very open econ-
omy is not likely to settle on an equilibrium
where foreign money does not circulate. An-
other thing we can conclude is that for this
regime to constitute an equilibrium, we re-
quireMjto be big. If there are few foreign
buyers and many foreign sellers, then it is
easier to spend foreign money, and so you
should accept it even if you expect local sell-




Now turn to the regime with two in-
ternational currencies,  = (1,1). The ﬁrst
thing to do is to solve equations 1–2 for
mij. Routine algebra yields the steady state
for citizens of Country 1, which can be de-
scribed by
(12) m10 = 1 -
(13) m11 =
M1 .
The steady state for citizens of Country 2 is
described by reversing the subscripts. No-
tice that mi0is decreasing in both M1and M2.
The value functions now satisfy:
(14) rVi0 = ( iimii + ijmji)(Vii - Vi0)
+ ( iimij + ijmjj)(Vij - Vi0)
(15) rVii = ( iimi0 + ijmj0)(U + Vi0 - Vii)
(16) rVij = ( iimi0 + ijmj0)(U + Vi0 - Vij).
These equations imply that Vii = Vij.
That is, buyers from either country are in-
different between holding Currency i and
Currency j ¹ i. So the currencies are per-
fect substitutes. It also follows that Vii >
Vi0, and so equations 6–7 are satisﬁed for
all parameter values. Hence, this regime
always constitutes an equilibrium. The in-
tuition is that if agents believe the two
currencies will be accepted by all sellers
then it is always rational for them to ac-
cept both currencies themselves.
ONE INTERNATIONAL
MONEY
We now turn to the regime where citi-
zens of Country 1 accept Currency 2, but
notviceversa, =(1,0).Onecansolveequa-
tions 1–2 for m11=M1and m21=0. The dis-
tribution of Currency 2 holdings is given by: 
(17) m12 = ,
(18) m22 = .
From these one can show that, for given
values of Mi, m10is lower and m20 higher in
this regime than in the other regimes. Also,
mi0is decreasing in both M1and M2.
The value functions for agents from
Country 1 satisfy
(19) rV10 = 11m11(V11 - V10)
+ ( 11m12  + 12m22)(V12 - V10),
(20) rV11 = 11m10(U + V10 - V11)
(21) r V1 2=( 1 1m1 0 + 1 2m2 0) (U+V1 0-V12) ,
( + 12)M2
+ 12 + 21(1 - M1)
12(1 - M1)M2
+ 12 + 21(1 - M1)
( + 12+ 21)+ 21[( + 21)(1-M1)+ 12(1-M2)]
( + 12+ 21)[ + 21(1-M1)+ 12(1-M2)]
( + 21)M1 + 12M2
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(22) rV20 = ( 21m12 + 22m22)(V22 - V20)
(23) rV21 = 21m10(U + V20 - V21)
(24) rV22 = ( 21m10 + 22m20)
(U + V20 - V22).
One thing that follows immediately from
these equations is that Vi2 > Vi0, so citizens
from both countries are willing to accept
Currency 2.
Hence, to show when this regime con-
stitutes an equilibrium, we need to check
the incentive constraints V11 ³ V10 (to
check that it is rational for Country 1 sell-
ers to accept Currency 1) and that V21 £ V20
(to check that it is rational for Country 2
sellers to reject Currency 1). The ﬁrst con-













the second is satisﬁed if and only if
(26) £ .
These can be interpreted as saying that it
is relatively easy for a buyer from Country
1 to ﬁnd a Country 1 seller, but relatively
hard for a Country 2 buyer to ﬁnd a
Country 1 seller.
MODEL SUMMARY
Here we summarize what has been
learned from the preceding analysis. Given
our maintained assumptions, there are
three qualitatively different types of equi-
libria. There is at most one equilibrium of
each type (that is, each  implies a unique
m and V). Properties of the different
regimes include:
1. =(0,0) (dollars circulate only in
America, pesos only in Mexico) is an
equilibrium if and only if equation
11 holds, which, in particular, is true
when  ijis small relative to  ii.
2. = (1,1) (dollars and pesos both
circulate in both countries) is al-
ways an equilibrium, and in this
regime Vi1 = Vi2 (dollars and pesos
are perfect substitutes); 
3. = (1,0) (dollars circulate in both
countries, pesos only in Mexico) is
an equilibrium if and only if equa-
tions 25–26 hold.
In Figure 1a we examine the set of
equilibria for different values of M1 and
M2, holding the other parameters ﬁxed. If
a region in the ﬁgure contains the label 
( 1, 2), then regime  = ( 1, 2) is an
equilibrium in this region. Notice that
equilibrium  = (1,1) exists for all M1 and
M2. Notice also that equilibrium  = (0,0)
exists only as long as M1 and M2 are nei-
ther too big nor too small. When Currency
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Figure 1a
Regions in (M1,M2) Space where 
the Different Equilibria Exist
Fixed Price Model
For 11 1, 12 0.15, 21 0.15, 22 1, r  0.1, 0.02
                              
                 
                              
        
        
        
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
                 
        
        
        
                                          
   
       
 
   
                                  
                                     
                         
 
 
     zens from Country i ﬁnd that either buy-
ing or selling locally is too difﬁcult and
ﬁnd it too tempting to take foreign money
that can be spent easily. The ﬁgure also
tells us about the existence regions for
equilibria  = (1,0) and  = (0,1); Cur-
rency 1 will be a unique international cur-
rency as long as it is not too abundant and
Currency 2 is not too scarce.
In Figure 1b we examine different val-
ues of  11 and  12, holding the other pa-
rameters ﬁxed. We see that as Country 1
becomes more open ( 12 is large relative
to  11), it is more difﬁcult to sustain an
equilibrium where 1 = 0, or where 2 = 1.
The opposite implications occur as local
trade in that country becomes easier (that
is, as  11 becomes larger).
For many parameter values there exist
multiple equilibria. Hence, which regime
we end up in depends to a large degree on
expectations. At the same time, fundamen-
tals—that is, preferences, technology, and
the values of M1 and M2—exert an impor-
tant inﬂuence. At least in some cases, a
particular regime cannot be an equilibrium
unless these fundamentals take on the right
values.
An interesting extension is the one an-
alyzed by Zhou (1994), who considers a
version of the model where agents differ-
entiate between home and foreign goods.
A given agent gets utility, u, from his pre-
ferred good and  < u from the other
good, where his preferred good ﬂuctuates
between domestic and imported, and back
again, according to Poisson processes.
Agents may consume only preferred goods
or some of both goods in equilibrium, de-
pending on parameter values and on the
type of equilibrium. In this model there
can also be currency exchanges in pure
strategy equilibria. For example, when a
Mexican holding a peso but having a taste
for American goods meets an American
holding a dollar but having a taste for
Mexican goods, there is an incentive for
them to swap monies in any regime other
than  = (1,1) (because in that regime the
currencies are perfect substitutes).
In any case, one shortcoming of the
model as it stands is that every trade is a
one-for-one swap. This of course makes it
impossible to discuss the way nominal
prices and exchange rates depend on vari-
ous components of the model. The exten-
sion in the next section remedies this.
THE MODEL WITH 
DIVISIBLE OUTPUT
We now turn to the model with divisi-
ble output. It is still assumed that when
buyers spend their money, they spend it
all, but now the amount of output they get
for their money will be determined
endogenously. When a seller produces q
units of output for a buyer (of the right
type), the latter enjoys utility, u(q), while
the former suffers disutility, c(q). With
no loss in generality, we can normalize
c(q) = q, as long as we also renormalize
u(q). This simply means that agents bar-
gain in terms of utils and not physical
units of output. We assume that u(0) = 0,
u¢(0) > 1, u¢(q) > 0 for all q > 0, u²(q) < 0 for
all q > 0, and there exists ˆ q > 0 such that
u( ˆ q) = ˆ q.
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Figure 1b
Regions in ( 11, 12) Space where 
the Different Equilibria Exist
Fixed Price Model
For M1 0.75,M2 0.75, 21 0.1, 22 2.5,r  0.1, 0.02
     
                   
                             
                                       
     
                               We need to appeal to some form of bi-
lateral bargaining theory to determine q.
For example, one could use the general-
ized Nash bargaining solution. This says
that when a buyer from Country i with
Currency j meets a seller from Country h,
if they trade at all, the quantity q solves
the following problem:
(27)
max[u(q) + Vi0 - Vij] [-q + Vhj - Vho]
1-
subject to u(q) + Vi0 - Vij ³ 0, 
and - q + Vhj - Vh0 ³ 0.
In this problem, qmaximizes the so-called
Nash product, which is the payoff to the
buyer,u(q)+Vi0, minus his threat point, Vij,
all to the power  , times the payoff to the
seller,-q+Vhj, minus his threat point, Vh0,
all to the power 1 - . The payoffs are what
the agents get if they trade, the threat points
a re what they get if they do not trade, and 
represents the relative bargaining power in
the hands of the buyer. The constraints say
that agents must get a greater payoff from
trading than from not trading.7
For simplicity, we assume here that
the buyer has all the bargaining power: 
= 1. This effectively means that he can
make a take it or leave it offer to the seller.
Two things follow immediately from this.
First, assuming that the buyer wants to
trade, he offers to exchange his money for
the quantity that makes the seller indiffer-
ent between accepting and rejecting (that
is, the second constraint will bind). Sec-
ond, this implies that the seller never gets
any of the gains from trade, and therefore
Vi0 = 0. Hence when a buyer from Country
i with Currency j meets a seller from
Country h, if they trade at all, then the
quantity is given by
(28) qhj = Vhj.
Note that this quantity depends on the
nationality of the seller and the currency
being used, but not on the nationality of
the buyer. Also note that the nominal
price of output in Country h in terms of
Currency j is phj = 1/qhj.
By construction, the seller always
wants to trade at the take-it-or-leave-it
offer. It is possible, however, that a buyer
may prefer to not trade at these terms. For
example, although an American seller will
always take pesos at some price, a buyer
with pesos may prefer to wait until he
meets a Mexican seller if the seller is ex-
pected to be willing to agree to a sufﬁ-
ciently better price. A buyer with Cur-
rency j is willing to trade with a seller
from Country i if and only if the utility he
derives from consuming qij exceeds the
value to keeping his money and spending
it elsewhere. Hence the following incentive
condition must be satisﬁed if regime  is
to constitute an equilibrium: 
(29) u(qij) > Vjj Þ i = 1
(30) u(qij) < Vjj Þ i = 0.
The value functions for buyers satisfy
(31) rVii = iimi0[u(qii) - Vii]
+ ijmj0 j[u(qji) - Vii]
(32) rVij = iimi0- i[u(qij) - Vij]
+ ijmj0[u(qjj) - vij],
for j ¹ i. We write equations 31 and 32 in
this way to facilitate comparison with the
model in the previous section; in particu-
lar, see equations 4 and 5. However,
strictly speaking, equations 31 and 32 are
not exactly correct without some modiﬁca-
tion in the framework, for the following
reason. Consider, for example, the case 
j = 0, which says that Currency i does
not circulate in Country j. Then equation
31 says that a buyer from Country i with
Currency i who meets a seller from Coun-
try j cannot trade. But, given the bargain-
ing rules, he always could offer to trade
and get Vji> 0 (the amount a seller from
Country j is willing to give for Currency i),
and in principle we should allow him that
option. In fact, one can show that even if
agents believe that  j = 0, a buyer from
Country i with Currency i who meets a
7 See Osborne and Rubinstein
(1990) for an extended discus-
sion on Nash bargaining and its
relation to explicit strategic bar-
gaining games.
MAY/ JU N E 1 9 9 6
FE D E R A L RE S E RV E BA N K O F ST.  LO U I S
125seller from Country j will offer to trade.8
This means that  j = 0 can never be an
equilibrium in the model as it stands.
However, this result is really just an
artifact of our simplifying assumptions
that the buyer gets to make a take it or
leave it offer and there is no possibility of
direct barter. Relaxing either of these al-
lows  j = 0 to be an equilibrium for some
parameter values, although it also compli-
cates the model signiﬁcantly. We can
maintain the simplicity of the present set
up and still generate equilibria with  j = 0
in another (albeit perhaps less satisfactory)
way, as follows. First, expand the bargain-
ing game so that a seller has to decide
whether to enter negotiations with a buyer
before the buyer gets to make his take it or
leave it offer. Then, given certain addi-
tional technical assumptions, it will be an
equilibrium for the seller to refuse to trade
given that he believes  j = 0. In this case,
equations 31 and 32 do describe the value
functions as functions of  . See Trejos and
Wright (1995b), for details.
Deﬁne the vectors q = (qij), V = (Vij),
and m = (mij). Then an equilibrium is now
a list ( , m, V, q) satisfying equations 1–2
and equations 28–32. Henceforth we ig-
nore the value functions because they are
redundant by virtue of the equilibrium
condition Vij = qij. Therefore, a steady-state
equilibrium is completely characterized by
the regime  , the asset distribution m, and
the values of the currencies q.
NO INTERNATIONAL
MONEY
Consider ﬁrst  = (0,0). First, note
that m does not depend on whether out-
put is divisible, so we already know
the asset distribution from the previous
section (this is, of course, true in any
regime). Now equations 31–32 can be re-


















for j ¹ i. In this regime, no transactions ac-
tually occur at qij for j ¹ i, but qij but tells
us how much one could get with Currency
j from Country i sellers.
It is not hard to show that, as long as this
equilibrium exists, qi i and qj i a re both de-
c reasing in Mi, and are independent of Mj
for j ¹ i. Also, q1 1 > q2 2 if and only if  1 1
(1 - M1) >  2 2(1 - M2). Because one unit
of Currency i buys qi i units of real output,
we can say that one unit of Currency 1 is
w o rth e = q1 1/q2 2 = p22/p1 1units of Curre n c y
2. This is the exchange rate that would be
implied by purchasing power parity.9 T h e
exchange rate e falls with M1 and rises
with M2. Also, e rises with  1 1 and falls
with  2 2. Of course, international diff e r-
ences in utility and production functions
would also inﬂuence e. We have kept
these the same across countries purely for
notational simplicity.
To see when this regime actually con-
stitutes an equilibrium, we must check the
maintained hypothesis that Currency i cir-
culates in Country i and the incentive con-
ditions in equations 29–30. The former
can easily be seen to hold for all parameter
values. The latter, which says that individ-
uals with Currency j do not want to buy
from sellers from Country i, holds if and
only if u(qij) £ qjj, for i ¹ j. Using equations
33–34, we can rewrite this inequality as
(35)
which is satisﬁed if and only if  ij is small
compared with  jj. The intuition is similar
to the model with indivisible output.
TWO INTERNATIONAL
MONIES
Now turn to the regime with two in-
ternational currencies,  = (1,1). One can
show that in this regime qii = qij = Qi;
That is, the two currencies are perfect
substitutes in the sense that they purchase
the same amount from a given seller. If
there were a market in which agents
8 We thank Rao Aiyagari for
pointing this out to us.
9 Suppose one peso buys q11
units of output in Mexico and
one dollar buys q22 units of out-
put in America, and suppose
that there is a market in which
currencies can be traded at the
nominal exchange rate e (that
is, one peso buys edollars).
Then one peso could be used to
buy eq22 units of output in
America using dollars.
Purchasing power parity holds if
a peso buys the same amount
directly at home and using dol-
lars abroad: q11eq22.
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ket clearing price would have to be 1. But
the purchasing power parity exchange
rate, as deﬁned above, is given by e =
Q1/Q2. In general e differs from unity in
this regime: Even though quantities do
not depend on which currency the buyer
is using, they do depend on the national-
ity of the seller.
One can also show that Q1 and Q2 are
both decreasing in M1 and M2. Thus an in-
crease in either money supply increases
the price level in both countries. Also, as
long as the two countries are not too dif-
ferent in terms of  ij and Mj, the effect of a
change in M1 is stronger in Country 1 than
in Country 2 and vice versa. This means
that the purchasing power parity exchange
rate e = Q1/Q2 is decreasing in M1 and in-
creasing in M2.
To see when this regime constitutes
an equilibrium, we need to check the in-
centive conditions in equations 29–30.
These hold in this regime if and only if
u(Qi) ³ Qj, j ¹ i. If the countries are sym-
metric, in the sense that M1 = M2, ii = jj
and  ij = ji, these conditions always hold
and the equilibrium with two international
currencies always exists. But if they are suf-
ﬁciently dissimilar, then the incentive con-
ditions will be violated and  = (1,1) is not
an equilibrium. The model is very different
in this regard from the one with indivisible
output. In that model, equilibrium  =
(1,1) exists for all parameter values. Here,
even if the two countries’ currencies are
perfect substitutes, the two nationalities of
sellers are not. For example, if  jj is low
relative to  ii then Country j sellers do not
give much for (either) currency compared
with Country i sellers, and Country i buy-
ers may prefer to hold on to their cash
rather than spend it in Country j.
ONE INTERNATIONAL
MONEY
We now turn to the regime where
citizens of Country 1 accept Currency 2,
but not vice versa,  = (1,0). The pur-




















which are qualitatively the same as in the
= (0,0) regime. Because m10 is lower in
this regime than in  = (0,0), q11 and q21
are lower here. Intuitively, the inﬂux of
foreign money inﬂates prices denominated
in the domestic currency. Also, q11 and q21
are decreasing in both M1 and M2 because
m10 is decreasing in both M1 and M2.
The purchasing power of the interna-
tional currency depends on the seller, as
given by 
(38) q12 =
(39) q22 = .
There is a unique nonzero solution for
(q12, q22) and both are decreasing in M1 and
M2. Since m10 is lower and m20 higher in
this regime, q12 is lower here than in the 
= (1,1) regime. Moreover, q12 > q11, with
the difference increasing in M1 - M2.
Hence, citizens of Country 1 value the in-
ternational currency more than their own
domestic currency. As long as the coun-
tries are not too dissimilar, one can also
show that q22 > q12.
We still need to check when this
equilibrium exists. The maintained
hypothesis that Currency i always circu-
lates in Country i holds if and only if
u(q22) ³ q12.10 Then equations 29–30 re-
quire u(q12) ³ q22, so Country 2 buyers
with Currency 2 buy from Country 1
sellers, and u(q21) £ q11, so that Country
1 buyers with Currency 1 do not buy
from Country 2 sellers. Each of these
conditions looks qualitatively like one
that has been encountered earlier and
holds under similar circumstances; how-
ever, because qij differs across regimes,
the parameter values for which the equi-
libria exist are quantitatively different.
21m10u(q12) + 22m20u(q22)
r + 21m10 + 22m20
11m10u(q12) + 12m20u(q22)
r + 11m10 + 12m20
10This condition, which says that
agents from Country 1 with
Currency 2 buy from Country 2
sellers, can bind for some para-
meter values in this regime. If
this condition were violated,
then Mexicans, for example,
would sell goods for dollars and
then spend these dollars on
Mexican sellers, but not on
American sellers.
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SUMMARY
As in the indivisible output model,
there are three qualitatively different
regimes and at most one equilibrium of each
type (that is, each  implies a unique mand
q). Other things being equal, the value of a
currency is higher if it circulates interna-
tionally and lower if the other money circu-
lates internationally. Other properties of the
different regimes include the following:
1. = (0,0) (dollars circulate only in
America, pesos only in Mexico) is
an equilibrium if and only if  ij is
small relative to  ii; in this regime,
qiiis decreasing in Mi and indepen-
dent of Mj.
2. = (1,1) (dollars and pesos both
circulate in both countries) is an
equilibrium if and only if the two
countries are not too dissimilar; in
this regime, q11 = q12 = Q1 and q21 =
q22 = Q2 (dollars and pesos are per-
fect  substitutes), Qi is decreasing
in Mi and Mj, and e = Q1/Q2and 
e = Q1/Q2is decreasing in M1 and
increasing in M2.
3. = (1,0) (dollars circulate in both
countries, pesos only in Mexico)
exists if a combination of the above
conditions hold. In this regime, qij
is decreasing in Mi and Mj for all i,
j, q12 ³ q11 (Mexicans value dollars
more than Mexicans value pesos),
and q22 > q12 (Americans value dol-
lars more than Mexicans value 
dollars) at least if the two countries
are not too dissimilar.
In Figure 2a we examine different val-
ues of M1and M2, holding the other parame-
ters ﬁxed. Notice that the regime  =(1,1)
exists for all M1and M2in this example, al-
though this is not true in general. Also, be-
cause  ijis relatively small, equilibrium 
=(0,0) exists for all but very high values of
M1 and M2. Equilibria where only one cur-
rency circulates internationally exist only if
the other currency is not too abundant. For
example,  =(1,0) exists only if M1is not too
big. In Figure 2b we examine variation in
11and  12. Now equilibrium  =(1,1) ex-
ists in only a small region of the ﬁgure. Equi-
librium  =(0,0) exists if and only if  12is
below some cutoff. Also notice that as either
11or  12increases, it becomes more likely
that equilibrium  =(1,0) exists. This is be-
cause as Country 1 increases either its inter-
nal economic activity or its openness, sellers
in Country 1 value money more highly and
this makes Country 2 buyers more willing
to deal with them.
POLICY
In this section we analyze the effects
of changes in (M1, M2) in the model with
divisible output and endogenize (M1, M2)
by modeling the objective functions of the
two governments and the rules for their
strategic interaction. Because for some
questions analytical results are difﬁcult to
derive, we analyze numerically an example
with u(q)= q. The features that we high-
light are ones that we can either prove an-
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Figure 2a
Regions in (M1,M2) Space where 
the Different Equilibria Exist
For 11 1, 12 0.15, 21 0.15, 22 1,r  0.1, 0.02
                   
         
       
       
                                                  
        
     
                               
       




   alytically to hold in general or those which
seem to be robust to alternative parameter-
izations in examples. 
Because Government i is assumed to
purchase goods from a fraction Mi of its
newborn citizens, per capita seigniorage
revenue in real terms is given by Si = Miqii.
One can show that S1 ﬁrst increases and
then decreases with M1. Also, given that
multiple equilibria exist, S1 is greater when
Currency 1 is international than when it is
not and lower when Currency 2 is interna-
tional than when it is not. Finally, given
M2, S1 is maximized at different levels of M1
in the different regimes, depending on the
extent to which Country 1 is able to export
inﬂation abroad.
We deﬁne welfare as the average
(steady state) utility of private citizens:
(40) Wi = mi0Vi0 + mi1Vi1 + mi2Vi2.
Which regime yields the highest welfare
depends on M1 and M2. For instance, if M1
is very low, then W1 is highest in regime 
= (1,0), where Currency 2 is accepted in
Country 1 but not vice versa, because this
makes trade easier within the host country.
Also,  = (1,1) may or may not dominate 
= (0,0). For instance, if M2 is very low or
very high, then W1 is highest in regime 
= (0,0).
The next step is to endogenize (M1, M2).
We assume that governments take the re-
gime as given and restrict their choices to
policies that allow for the existence of that
regime as an equilibrium (that is, we ignore
policies aimed at changing a currency’s
realm of circulation).11We also restrict at-
tention to policies that do not change over
time and to steady-state comparisons. 
We look for Nash equilibria when each
government seeks to maximize the welfare
of its own citizens, denoted (M1
W, M2
W). In
other words, W1 is maximized at M1
W when
M2
W is taken as given and vice versa. We
also look for Nash equilibria when each
government seeks to maximize seigniorage,
denoted (M1
S, M2
S). Given that they seek to
maximize seigniorage, we also consider the
possibility of international policy coordina-
tion by letting the governments choose
policies jointly. One way to do this is to as-
sume that seigniorage is freely transferable
across countries, in which case they maxi-
mize S1 + S2. We denote this outcome by
(M1
T, M2
T). Or we can assume seigniorage
is nontransferable, in which case we use
the bargaining solution that chooses (M1
N,
M2




S is seigniorage in Country j when
policy is given by (M1
S, M2
S).
We can summarize our ﬁndings as fol-
lows. First, if foreign money circulates in
Country i, independently of whether Cur-
rency i circulates abroad, then the welfare
maximizing level of Mi is lower than the
level that maximizes seigniorage. However,
when foreign money does not circulate in
Country i, welfare and seigniorage are
maximized at the same value of Mi.12 Sec-
ond, starting from the Nash equilibrium
where governments maximize seigniorage,
reducing the amount of money in both
countries increases welfare in both coun-
tries. Third, and more interestingly, reduc-
ing the amount of money in both coun-
tries increases seigniorage for both
11There may actually be very
interesting policies, but we
leave such a discussion to
future research.
12This can be explained as fol-
lows. Welfare in Country 1, for
example, is W1 = m11 V11+
m12 V12, whereas seigniorage is
S1=  M1V11. When no foreign
money is held at home (m12 =
0), m11is proportional to M1
and maximizing seigniorage is
the same as maximizing wel-
fare. This result is not particular-
ly robust and does not hold in
generalized versions of the
model that include barter or
other bargaining solutions. 
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Figure 2b
Regions in ( 11, 12) Space where 
the Different Equilibria Exist
                         
                       
                                     
     
                                                 
         
                       
                                 
     governments. As neither government takes
into account the effect it has on the other,
the noncooperative equilibrium is charac-




money and more seigniorage.
These results hold in general. We now
describe in more detail the ﬁndings from the
numerical examples. We depict the frontier
and the outcomes in (S1,S2) space, assum-
ing the regime is  =(1,0) in Figure 3a and 
=(1,1) in Figure 3b (the regime with no
international currency is uninteresting for
this exercise). The points labeled W,S,T,
and Nare the payoffs in the four scenarios:
the noncooperative equilibrium between
welfare maximizers, the noncooperative
equilibrium between seigniorage maximiz-
ers, the cooperative solution when revenue
is transferable, and the cooperative solution
when revenue is nontransferable. In the
transferable revenue case, the point Tde-
picts the seigniorage raised in each country
and not the ﬁnal division of the revenue be-
tween the governments. Figures 4a and 4b
show the same points in (W1,W2) space. Be-
cause the graphs are drawn using the same
scales, one thing they illustrate is how the
possible values of seigniorage and welfare
vary across regimes.
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Figure 4a,b
Feasible and Equilibrium 
Welfare
For a11 1,a12 0.15,a21 0.15,a22 1,
r 0.1,g  0.02
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 The results we wish to highlight are as
follows. First, though the cooperative solu-
tions are on the frontier in (S1,S2) space, 
the noncooperative solutions are inside the
frontier. This is especially so in regime 
=(1,1), where it is easiest to export inﬂa-
tion. Also, Figure 3a shows that in regime 
=(1,0), when transfers are allowed, the co-
operative solution is to concentrate seign-
iorage collection in Country 2, where it can
be done more efﬁciently. That is, the govern-
ments print more of the international cur-
rency and less of the national currency in
addition to printing less money in total.
Figure 4 shows how the possible val-
ues of (W1, W2) are much higher in regime
= (1,1). However, each of the outcomes
is inside the frontier. Also, when both gov-
ernments try to maximize seigniorage, one
of them may actually end up with less
seigniorage than when both are trying to
maximize welfare. Symmetrically, citizens
in one country may be worse off in terms
of welfare when both governments are try-
ing to maximize welfare than when both
governments are concerned with seignior-
age, as can be seen in the ﬁgure for Coun-
try 1 in regime  = (1,0). Finally, in regime
= (1,0), the country that issues interna-
tional money is better off.
FINAL REMARKS
This article has summarized some re-
cent results in the literature on search-
theoretic models of international currency.
We think that models in this class will
eventually prove useful for studying im-
portant issues in international monetary
economics. The analysis illustrates the po-
tential welfare gains from having one cur-
rency (or two currencies that serve as per-
fect substitutes). However, it also indicates
that there can be a welfare loss in one
country from having a uniﬁed currency if
another country is pursuing a particularly
bad policy from the former’s point of view.
It may be interesting to consider versions
of the model where the two countries have
different preferences or production tech-
nologies or are subject to different shocks
to analyze the tradeoffs between having
one currency, one central bank or both.
While this may help to facilitate trade, it
makes it more difﬁcult to have indepen-
dent monetary policies tailored to condi-
tions in the individual economies. We
leave this to future research.
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